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CHAPTER XVI WAR!
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War always
changes the composition of a nation; but this change may be
either a loss or
a gain. The modification of selection by war is far
!more manifold
than the literature on the biological effects of war would lead the reader to
suppose. All wars are partly eugenic and partly dysgenic; some are mainly the
one, some are mainly the other. The racial effects of war occur in at least
three periods:
!The period of
preparation.
!The period of
actual fighting.
!The period of
readjustment after the war.
The first
division involves the effect of a standing army, which
withdraws men
during a part of the reproductive period and keeps most of them in a celibate
career. The officers marry late if at all and show a
very low
birth-rate. The prolonged celibacy has in many armies led to a higher incidence
of venereal diseases which prolongs the celibacy and lowers the birthrate.[155]
Without extended discussion, the following considerations may be named as among
those which should govern a policy of military preparedness that will
safeguard, as far as possible, the
!eugenic interests:
If the army is a
standing one, composed of men serving long terms of enlistment, they should be
of as advanced an age as is compatible with military efficiency. If a man of 35
has not married, it is probable that he will never marry, and therefore there
is less loss to the race in enrolling him for military service, than is the
case with a man of
!20-25.
!The army
(except in so far as composed of inferior men) should not foster celibacy.
Short enlistments are probably the most valuable means of avoiding this evil.
!Universal
conscription is much better than voluntary service, since the latter is highly
selective, the former much less so. Those in regular attendance in college
should receive their military training in their course as is now done.
Officers'
families should be given an additional allowance for each child. This would aid
in increasing the birth-rate, which appears to be very low among army and navy
officers in the United States service, and
!probably in
that of all civilized countries.
Every citizen
owes service to his nation, in time of need, but
fighting service
should not be exacted if some one else could perform it better than he where he
is expert in some other needed field. The recent action of England in sending
to the front as subaltern officers, who were speedily killed, many highly
trained technicians and young
scientists and
medical men who would have been much more valuable at home in connection with
war measures, is an example of this mistake.
Carrying the
idea farther, one sees that in many nations there are certain races which are
more valuable on the firing line than in industries at the rear; and it appears
that they should play the part for which they are best fitted. From this point
of view, the Entente allies were wholly justified in employing their Asiatic
and African
!subjects in
war. In the United States are millions of negroes who are of less value than
white men in organised industry but almost as valuable as the whites, when
properly led, at the front. It would appear to be sound statesmanship to enlist
as many Negroes as possible in the active forces, in case of war, thus
releasing a corresponding number of more skilled white workers for the
industrial machine on whose efficiency success in modern warfare largely rests.
Leaving the
period of preparedness, we consider the period of open warfare. The reader will
remember that, in an earlier chapter, we divided natural selection into (1)
lethal, that which operates through differential mortality; (2) sexual, that
which operates through differential mating; and (3) fecundal, that which
operates through differential fecundity. Again, selection operates both in an
inter-group
competition and
an intra-group competition. The influence of any agency on natural selection
must be examined under each of these six heads. In the case of war, however,
fecundal selection may be eliminated, as it is little influenced. Still another
division arises from the fact that the
!action of
selection is different during war upon the armed forces themselves and upon the
population at home; and after the war, upon the nations with the various
modifications that the war has left.
We will consider
lethal selection first. To measure the effect of the inter-group selection of
the armed forces, one must compare the relative quality of the two races
involved. The evidence for believing in substantial differences between races
is based (a) upon their relative achievement when each is isolated, (b) upon
the relative rank when the two are competing in one society, and (c) upon the
relative number of original contributions to civilisation each has made. Such
comparisons are fatal to the sentimental equalitarianism that denies race
differences. While there is, of course, a great deal of
!overlapping,
there are, nevertheless, real average differences. To think otherwise is to
discard evolution and revert to the older standpoint of "special
creation."
Comparison of
the quality of the two sides is sometimes, of course, very difficult. One may
feel little hesitation in giving a decision in the classical war of the Greeks
and Persians, or the more modern case of the
English and
Afghans, but when considering the Franco-Prussian war, or the Russo-Japanese
war, or the Boer war, or the American civil war, it
!is largely a
matter of mere opinion, and perhaps an advantage can hardly be conceded to
either side. Those who, misunderstanding the doctrine of evolution, adhere to
the so-called "philosophy of force," would answer without hesitation
that the side which won was, ipso facto, the better side. But such a judgment
is based on numerous fallacies, and can not be endorsed in the sweeping way it
is uttered. Take a concrete example:
!"In 1806,
Prussia was defeated at the battle of Jena. According to the philosophy of
force, this was because Prussia was 'inferior' and France was 'superior.'
Suppose we admit for the moment that this was the case. The selection now
represents the survival of the fittest, the selection which perfects the human
species. But what shall we say of the battle of Leipsic? At Leipsic, in 1813,
all the values were reversed; it is now France which is the 'inferior'
nation.... Furthermore, a large number of the same generals and soldiers who
took part in the battle of Jena also took part in the battle of Leipsic.
Napoleon belonged, therefore, to a race which was superior to that of BlΓΌcher in 1806, but to an inferior
race in 1813, in spite of the fact that they were the same persons and had not
changed their nationality. As soon as we bring these assertions to the
touchstone of concrete reality we see at once how untenable and even ridiculous
are direct biological comparisons."[156]
!Without going
into further detail, it is readily seen that, on the world at large, the
eugenic effect of a war would be very different according as the sides differ
much or little. Yet this difference in quality, however great, will have no
significance, unless the superior or inferior side is in general more likely to
lose fewer men. Where the difference has been considerable, as between a
civilised and savage nation, it has been seldom that the superior has not triumphed
with fewer losses. Victory, however, is influenced much less in these later
days by the relative military efficiency of two single nations than by their
success in making powerful alliances. But such alignments are by no means
always associated with better quality, because (a) there is a natural tendency
for the weak to unite against a strong nation, (b) to side with a group which
is apparently succeeding, and (c) the alliances may be the work of one or a few
individuals who happen to be in positions of power at the critical time.
Modern European
wars, especially the latest one, have been marked by the high quality of the
combatants on both sides relative to the rest of the world. As these same races
fight with pertinacity, there is a high
!mortality rate,
so that the dysgenic result of these wars is particularly deplorable.
As for the
selection taking place within each of the struggling
nations, the
combatants and the non-combatants of the same age and sex must first be
compared. The difference here depends largely on how the army in question was
raised. Where the army is a permanent, paid force, it probably does not
represent a quality above the average of the
nation, except
physically. When it is conscripted, it is superior
physically and
probably slightly in other respects. If it is a
volunteer army,
its quality depends largely on whether the cause being fought for is one that
appeals merely to the spirit of adventure or one that appeals to some moral
principle. In the latter case, the quality may be such that the loss of a large
part of the army will be peculiarly
damaging to the
progress of the race. This situation is more common than might be supposed, for
by skillful diplomacy and journalism a cause which may be really questionable
is presented to the public in a most idealistic light. But here, again, one can
not always apply sweeping generalisations to individual cases. It might be
supposed, for instance, that in the Confederate army the best eugenic quality
was represented by the volunteers, the second best by those who stayed out
until they were conscripted, and the poorest by the deserters. Yet David Starr
Jordan
and Harvey
Ernest Jordan, who investigated the case with care, found that this was hardly
true and that, due to the peculiar circumstances, the deserters were probably
not as a class eugenically inferior to the
volunteers.[157]
Again some wars, such as that between the United States and Spain, probably
develop a volunteer army made up largely of the adventurous, the nomadic, and
those who have fewer ties; it would be difficult to demonstrate that they are
superior to those who, having settled positions at home, or family obligations,
fail to volunteer. The greatest damage appears to be done in such wars as those
waged by great European nations, where the whole able-bodied male population is
called out, and only those left at home who are physically or mentally unfit
!for
fighting--but not, it appears to be thought, unfit to perpetuate the race.
!Even within the
army of one side, lethal selection is operative. Those who are killed are by no
means a haphazard sample of the whole army. Among the victims there is a
disproportionate representation of those with (1) dauntless bravery, (2)
recklessness, (3) stupidity. These qualities merge into each other, yet in
their extremes they are widely different. However, as the nature of warfare
changes with the increase of artillery, mines, bombs, and gases, and decrease
of personal combat, those who fall are more and more chance victims.
In addition to
the killed and mortally wounded, there are many deaths from disease or from
wounds which were not necessarily fatal. Probably the most selective of any of
these three agencies is the variable
resistance to
disease and infection and the widely varying knowledge and appreciation of the
need for hygienic living shown by the individual,
!as, for
instance, by less reckless drinking of un-sterilised water. But here, too, in
modern warfare, this item is becoming less selective, with the advance in
discipline and in organised sanitation.
!The efficiency
of selection will be affected by the percentage that each side has sent to the
front, if the combatants are either above or below the average of the
population. A nation that sends all its able-bodied males forward will be
affected differently from its enemy that has needed to call upon only one-half
of its able-bodied men in order to win its cause.
Away from the
fighting lines of the contending sides, conditions that prevail are rendered
more severe in many ways than in times of peace. Poverty becomes rife, and
sanitation and medical treatment are commonly sacrificed under the strain.
During a war, that mitigation of the action
!of natural
selection which is so common now among civilised nations, is somewhat less
effective than in times of peace. The scourge of typhus in Serbia is a recent
and graphic illustration.
After a war has
been concluded, certain new agencies of inter-group selection arise. The result
depends largely on whether the vanquished have had a superior culture brought
to them, as in the case of the Philippines, or whether, on the contrary,
certain diseases have been introduced, as to the natives of the New World by
the Spanish conquerors and explorers, or crushing tribute has been levied, or
grievous
!oppression such
as has befallen Belgium.
Sometimes the
conquerors themselves have suffered severely as the result of excessive
spoliation, which has produced vicious idleness and luxurious indulgence, with
the ultimate effect of diminishing the
!birth-rate.
!Within the
nation there may be various results. Sometimes, by the reduction of
overcrowding, natural selection will be less severe. On the other hand, the
loss of that part of the population which is more economically productive is a
very serious loss, leading to excessive poverty with increased severity in the
action of natural selection, of which some of the Southern States, during the
Reconstruction period, offer a good illustration.
!Selection is
also rendered more intense by the heavy burden of taxation, and in the very
common depreciation of currency as is now felt in Russia.
!Sexual
selection as well as lethal is affected by war in manifold ways. Considering
the armed force, there is an inter-group selection, when the enemy's women are
assaulted by the soldiers. While this has been an important factor in the past,
it is somewhat less common now, with better army discipline and higher social
ideals.
!Within the
group, mating at the outset of a war is greatly increased by many hurried
marriages. There is also alleged to be sometimes an increase of illegitimacy in
the neighbourhood of training camps. In each of these instances, these matings
do not represent as much maturity of judgment as there would have been in times
of peace, and hence give a less desirable sexual selection.
In the
belligerent nation at home, the number of marriageable males is of course far
less than at ordinary times. It becomes important, then,
to compare the
quality of the non-combatants and those combatants who survive and return home,
since their absence during the war period of course decreases their
reproduction as compared with the non-combatants. The marked excess of women
over men, both during the war and after,
necessarily
intensifies the selection of women and proportionately reduces that of men,
since relatively fewer men will remain unmated. This excess of women is found
in all classes. Among superiors there are,
!in addition,
some women who never marry because the war has so reduced the number of suitors
thought eligible.
The five years'
war of Paraguay with Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina (1864-1869) is perhaps the
most glaring case on record[158] in recent years of the destruction of the male
population of a country. Whole regiments were made up of boys of 16 or less. At
the beginning of the war the population of Paraguay had been given as
1,337,437. It fell to 221,709 (28,746 men, 106,254 women, 86,079 children); it
is even now probably not more than half of the estimate made at the beginning
of the war. "Here in a small area has occurred a drastic case of racial
ravage without parallel since the time of the Thirty Years' War."
Macedonia, however, furnishes a fairly close parallel--D. S. Jordan found whole
villages there in 1913 in which not a single man remained: only women and
children. Conditions were not so very much better in parts of the South at the
close of the Civil War, particularly in Virginia and North
Carolina, where
probably 40% of the young men of reproductive age died without issue. And in a
few of the Northern states, such as Vermont, Connecticut and Massachusetts, the
loss was proportionately almost as great. These were probably as good men as
any country has produced, and their loss, with that of their potential
offspring, undoubtedly is
!causing more
far-reaching effects in the subsequent history of the United States than has
ever been realised.
!In the past and
still among many savage peoples, inter-group selection has been affected by the
stealing of women from the vanquished. The effect of this has been very
different, depending on whether these women would otherwise have been killed or
spared, and also depending on the relative quality of their nation to that of
their conquerors.
!To sum up,
there are so many features of natural selection, each of which must be separately weighed and the
whole then balanced, that it is a matter of extensive inquiry to determine
whether a certain war has a preponderance of eugenic or dysgenic results.
When the quality
of the combatants is so high, compared with the rest
of the world, as
during the Great War, no conceivable eugenic gains from the war can offset the
losses. It is probably well within the facts to assume that the period of this
war represents a decline in inherent human quality, greater than in any similar
length of time in the
!previous
history of the world.
Unfortunately,
it does not appear that war is becoming much less common if we consider number
of combatants rather than number of wars as times goes on,[159] and it steadily
tends to be more destructive. War, then, offers one of the greatest problems
which the eugenist must face, for a
!few months of
war may undo all that eugenic reforms can gain in a generation.
The total
abolition of war would, of course, be the ideal, but there is no possibility of
this in the near future. The fighting instinct, it
must be
remembered, is one of the most primitive and powerful that the human mechanism
contains. It was evolved in great intensity, to give man supremacy over his
environment--for the great "struggle for existence"
is with the
environment, not with members of one's own species. Man long ago conquered the
environment so successfully that he has never since had to exert himself in
physical combat in this direction; but the
!fighting
instinct remained and could not be baulked without causing uneasiness. Spurred
on by a complex set of psychological and economic stimuli, man took to fighting
his own kind, to a degree that no other species shows.
The only
immediate course of action open seems to be to seek, if possible, to diminish
the frequency of war by subduing nations which start wars and, by the organization
of
!a League to
Enforce Peace; to avoid war-provoking conquests; to diminish as much as
possible the disastrous effects of war when it does come, and to work for the
progress of science and the diffusion of knowledge which will eventually make
possible the greater step, effective international organisation.
!
!